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Fenn: Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Providing Former Employees with Protec

ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL CO.: PROVIDING
FORMER EMPLOYEES WITH
PROTECTION FROM RETALIATION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer is
prohibited from discriminating against an employee based on the
employee's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.' The statute
also has an anti-retaliation provision, which provides that an
employer is further prohibited from discriminating against
"employees or applicants for employment" because he/she has
invoked his/her rights under this subchapter, and opposed any

unlawful, discriminatory practice, or because he/she has made a
"charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
In general, although there is a lack of legislative history regarding
this portion of Title VII,3 it is believed that, since the statute is
enforced through aggrieved individuals filing charges, Congress
intended to provide victims of alleged discrimination with protec-

tion from retaliation, once they have invoked their rights under the
statute.4 However, there has been some dispute as to whether or

not former employees are protected from retaliation under section
704(a), since the statute does not explicitly mention them.5
1. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §703, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1996).
2. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (1996).
3. See Interpretative Memorandum on Title VII (1964), reprinted in EQuAL
EMILOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMIV'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TrrLs VII AND XI OF THE
CIVL RiGrrs Acr OF 1964, at 3040 (1969) (failing to make a statement as to whether the
anti-retaliation provision applies to former employees); Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title VII's
AntiretaliationProvision:Are Employees Protected After the Employment Relationship has
Ended? 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797, 805 (1996).
4. See Tafuri, supra note 3, at 806-16 (discussing arguments for a broad interpretation,
including specifically Congress's overall purpose behind Title VII).
5. There is currently a split in the circuit courts, and recently this issue came before the

Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell, 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997).
The 4th Circuit followed a narrow interpretation in Robinson, and concluded that former
employees are not protected under the statute. See id. The 4th Circuit first promulgated this
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According to the statute's definition, the term "employee" means
"an individual employed by an employer."' 6 Although this phrase is
generally acknowledged to mean someone currently employed, it is
argued that it can also refer to someone who was formerly
employed.7 Consequently, this definition is not helpful in providing
clarification on the issue, and can be viewed as ambiguous by supporters of a broad interpretation.
There was a recent split in the circuits on this issue, 8 making the
fate of former employees who brought suits based on retaliation
unclear. However, the Supreme Court finally resolved this debate
last year with its opinion in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,9 declaring
opinion in Polsby v. Chase,970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on othergrounds, 507 U.S.
1048 (1993). The 7th Circuit also promulgated a narrow interpretation in Reed v. Shepard,
939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
6. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (1996).
7. See Petitioner's Brief at 8-13, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No.
95-1376).
S. See the circuit court cases supporting a narrow interpretation: Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997); Nelson v. Upsala College, 51
F.3d 383 (3rd Cir. 1995); Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other
grounds, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
See the circuit court cases supporting a broad interpretation: Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87
F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996); Charlton
v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d
1322 (5th Cir. 1991); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990);
Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864
(9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Corp., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v.
American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
See James Francis Barna, Comment, Keeping the Boss at Bay Post-TerminationRetaliation
Under Tile VII: Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education, 47 WASH. U. J. URn. & CONTEMP.
L. 259 (1995); Patricia A. Moore, Partingis Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of Title VII
to Post-Employment Termination, 62 FORe,HAM L. REv. 205 (1993); Todd Mitchell, Note,

Terminate, Then Retaliate: Title VII Section 704(a) and Robinson v. Shell Oil, Co., 75 N.C. L.
Rtv.. 376 (1996); Tafuri, supra note 3.
9. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on Feb. 18, 1997. See Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997). The following brief synopsis of the case was included in the
beginning of the Supreme Court's decision:
Respondent Shell Oil Co. fired petitioner Charles T. Robinson, Sr., in 1991. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging that respondent had
discharged him because of his race. While that charge was pending, petitioner
applied for a job with another company. That company contacted respondent, as
petitioner's former employer, for an employment reference. Petitioner claims that
respondent gave him a negative reference in retaliation for his having filed the
EEOC charge. Petitioner subsequently sued under § 704(a), alleging retaliatory
discrimination. On respondent's motion, the District Court dismissed the action,
adhering to previous Fourth Circuit precedent holding that § 704(a) does not apply
to former employees. Petitioner appealed, and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit
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that former employees are protected under section 704(a). 10 The

Court concluded that, although both sides presented persuasive
arguments, after careful analysis and consideration, the statutory
language was in fact ambiguous," and in order to resolve this ambi-

guity, it was necessary to look to the overall purpose of Title VII
and the EEOC's interpretation.

2

The Court held that Congress did

intend to provide former employees with protection from retaliation after the employment relationship has been terminated, and

that a broad interpretation is appropriate. 3
After the oral argument,' 4 although it appeared likely that the

Supreme Court would support a broad interpretation and follow
the lead of the majority of the circuit courts,' 5 the unanimous decision was surprising. In light of the questions and comments made
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and strict constructionist, Justice Scalia,
reversed the District Court. The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated
the panel decision, and thereafter affirmed the District Court's determination that
former employees may not bring suit under § 704(a) for retaliation occurring after
termination of their employment.
Id. at 845.
10. See id. at 843.
11. See id. at 846. Justice Thomas stated:
The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole. In this case, consideration of those factors leads us
to conclude that the term "employees," as used in § 704(a), is ambiguous as to
whether it excludes former employees.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. See id. 848. The author of this Note strongly agrees with the decision which the
Supreme Court rendered. However, for an interesting critique of the decision from the
opposition's perspective, which declares that the Supreme Court's "judicial extension of Ttle
VII was unwarranted," see generally Barry T. Meek, Note, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Policy
- Not Ambiguity - Drives the Supreme Court's Decision to Broaden Title VII's Retaliation
Coverage, 31 U. RcH. L. Rav. 473, 475 (1997) (arguing that it was not Congress's intent to
extend coverage to former employees, evidenced by the absence of any express language

doing so).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 132-46.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 119-31.
15. See supra text accompanying note 8. Seven circuit courts have held that former
employees have a cause of action for retaliation related to the employment relationship. See
Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d
980 (10th Cir. 1996); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); EEOC v.
J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891
F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988); O'Brien v.
Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Corp., 581 F.2d 1052
(2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
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a dissent seemed likely. 6 Furthermore, after analysis of prior
Court decisions involving Title VII and the EEOC,17 deference to
the enforcement agency was not anticipated, and although not
explicitly a Chevron'8 decision, the opinion relies heavily on the
position promulgated by the EEOC and virtually constitutes
deference.
Had the Court been split, the author would have recommended
legislative reform in order to ensure protection of the rights of former employees, yet such a recommendation seems fruitless in light
of a unanimous decision.' 9 The chance of employers combating a
unanimous decision is nil and, therefore, what must be analyzed are
the repercussions of the decision on employers' willingness to give
references. According to the reaction of employer associations, in
all probability, Robinson will make employers hesitant to give out
20
references more extensive than "name, rank and serial number."
However, this result is a small price to pay, in return for protecting
former employees from retaliation and ensuring that they will not
be reluctant to file a complaint if they are victimized by retaliation.
In actuality, the Robinson decision does not impose any onerous
burdens on employers to avoid liability. All it does is simply21force
employers "to start living up to the obligations of the law."
If. THE RoAD TO ROBINSON
A.

Statutory Language

The anti-retaliation provision explicitly covers employees and applicants and makes no reference to former employees.2' Title VII's
definition of an "employee" refers to "an individual employed by
an employer."'2 Many strict constructionists have argued that the
statutory language is unambiguous, and there is no need to look to
16. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
18. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that Congressional delegation of law-interpreting power to an agency
need not be express, but could be implied from the statutory scheme).
19. See infra text accompanying note 153.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 169-78.
21. Joan Biskupic, Court ProtectsEx-Employees From Retaliation,WAsH.PosT, Feb. 19,
1997, at A6.
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §704(a), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (1996).
23. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (1996).
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legislative history or congressional intent.24 However, supporters of

a broad interpretation have argued that there is room to include
former employees in the definition of the term "employee" under
the statute. They argued that although "employed" can be used in
the passive voice to mean presently employed, it can also be used in
the active voice to mean employed in the past.' Supporters of a
broad interpretation also pointed out that "employee" is used in
nine instances in Title VII, in which the term "clearly encompasses
26
former employees.
Both sides of this argument (over how the term "employee"
should be construed within section 704(a) of Title VII), were summarized nicely in the briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court
prior to the oral arguments for Robinson v. Shell 27
According to the respondent's brief, if the "normal rules of statutory construction" were followed, the Fourth Circuit's decision
should have been affirmed, and the statute interpreted so as not to
include former employees.2 The respondent asserted that, "[t]he
language of Section 704(a) is clear and unambiguous. Employers
are prohibited from retaliating against 'his employees and applicants for employment.' Former employees are not included within
the protection of Section 704(a)." 29 The respondent stated that the
only time a court may stray from the plain language of an unambiguous statute is when either, "the literal application of the statute
would lead to an absurd result," or "when literal application of the
statutory language would produce a result demonstrably at odds
with the intent of Congress."30
Furthermore, the respondent highlighted the distinction between
the use of the words "individual" and "employee" in the statutory
language of Title VII' "Had Congress intended to prohibit retaliation by an employer against former employees or applicants for
employment it could have easily substituted the term 'individual'
24.
25.
26.
27.

1376).
28.
29.
30.
31.

See Respondent's Brief at 11-16, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
See Petitioner's Brief at 18-19, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
Id. at 14.
See Respondent's & Petitioner's Briefs, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-

See Respondent's Brief at 9, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
See id. at 15.
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for 'his employees' in Section 704(a)." 32 The respondent noted that
this is exactly what Congress did with recent legislation such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,3 3 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. 34
Also, the respondent noted that Congress could have easily
included "former employees," along with "employees or applicants
for employment" in section 704(a). The respondent cited other
examples of legislation in which Congress did exactly that, 36 i.e.,
The Occupational Safety and Health Act,37 and The Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989.38
The respondent argued that, in light of these statutes which either
include specific reference to former employees or language broad
enough to cover them under the general interpretation, "it can
hardly be argued that the omission of former employees from the
704(a) was inadvertent or unforeseen. There
protection of section
39
is no ambiguity."
The petitioner on the other hand, argued that the statutory definition of "employee" in Title VII, "an individual employed by an
employer,"'4 can mean, "'an individual formerly employed,'
because 'employed' is both the past and present tense, passive voice
and the past tense, active voice of the verb 'employ."'41
B. Lack of Legislative History
Although Justice Scalia disagrees with this method of interpretation,42 one way of trying to resolve the issue of whether or not the
term "employees" should be construed to include "former employees," was to look to Congressional intent and the underlying purpose of Title VII. However, it was virtually impossible to look to
32.

d.

33. 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (1996).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2615 (1996).
35. See Respondent's Brief at 15, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. (1997) (No. 95-1376).
36. Id. at 16.

37. 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (1996).
38. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1212(a)(1), 1213(a)(1), 1214 (a)(3), & 1221 (1996).
39. Respondent's Brief at 16, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).

40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1996).
41. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
42. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress!
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL L. REv. 613, 676 (1991) (referring to Justice Scalia's
"new textualist" approach, focusing on the "plain meaning" of the statutory text, without
consideration of the "subjective" preferences of Congress).
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the legislative history of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII in
order to determine Congressional intent, because there is sparse
legislative history on the applicable section, section 704(a), and it
does not address the issue of whether or not former employees are
covered by the section.4 3
C. EEOC's Position
In light of the lack of legislative history, and the split in the circuits, it appears as though the next place to look for guidance in
analyzing this question was the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Under Title VII, the EEOC is the administrative agency responsible for the enforcement of Title VII.4 In its
Compliance Manual, the EEOC explicitly states in the introduction
portion of the retaliation section that, "[s]ection 704(a) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is intended to provide
'exceptionally broad protection' for protesters of discriminatory
employment practices," and the Commission is committed to this
"exceptionally broad" policy of protecting individuals who protest
unlawful employment discrimination.45
In its Compliance Manual, the Commission emphasizes the
importance of the anti-retaliation provision for the effective
enforcement of Title VII:
The effective enforcement of Title VII... depends in very large
part on the initiative of individuals to oppose employment policies or practices which are reasonably believed to be unlawful.
Protesting or otherwise opposing suspected discrimination serves
to alert potential respondents to possible violations and allows
them the opportunity to examine the matter brought to their
attention and, where necessary, to take independent corrective
action. Similarly, the filing of charges or complaints of discrimination and the information or assistance provided by witnesses
and others in connection with an investigation greatly enhances
the Commission's ability to carry out its duty of administering
and enforcing Title VII.... If retaliation for engaging in such
43. See Interpretative Memorandum on Title VII (1964), reprinted in EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE IISTORY OF TrrLsS VII AND XI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 3039-40 (1969).
44. See Rebecca Harmer White, The EEOC, The Courts, and Employment
Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,
1995 UTAH L. Rlv. 51, 58-63 (1995).

45. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) s. 614.1(a) at 614-1 (1991).
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protected activity were permitted to go unremedied, it would
have a chilling effect upon the willingness of individuals to speak
out against employment discrimination.46
Later on, within this same section on retaliation, under a list of
examples of forbidden retaliations, the Commission explicitly states
that post-employment retaliation is prohibited. n7 According to the
Commission,
[a] respondent employer's obligation to refrain from retaliation
against a former employee who has opposed discrimination does
not end once that employee leaves its employ. It is a violation of
Section 704(a) . . . to retaliate against a former employee in

either of the following ways: (1) Discriminatorily unfavorable
recommendation ....
[and] (2) Unwarranted contesting of an
unemployment compensation claim ... .48

Clearly, the EEOC's position makes logical sense and presumably seems to support the underlying purpose of Title VII and section 704(a). 49 However, many disagree with this position and state
that this presumption is incorrect because of the lack of any explicit
Congressional statement on the issue.5" Yet, in light of the fact that
this clear EEOC position statement exists and the majority of the
circuit courts have enforced this position, it seems hard to believe
that if this was not their intent, Congress would not have attempted
to take some affirmative action to correct the situation prior to the
case reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.5
D. Legislative Inaction
It has reasonably been argued that if Congress disagreed with the
broad interpretation of Title VII's anti-retaliation clause by the
majority of the circuit courts, they would have taken some affirmative action to correct the situation and, therefore, their inaction has
been interpreted to mean they agree with the broad interpreta46. Id. at 614-17.
47. See id. at 614-34.
48. Id.

49. See Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title VIi's Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees
Protected After the Employment Relationship has Ended? 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797, 807-14
(1996).
50. See id. at 802.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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tion.52 In fact, the Supreme Court has been known to rely on this
'5 3
one type of "subsequent legislative history: legislative inaction.
It has been noted that, "[w]hile legislative inaction may not conclusively reflect legislative intent, one may reasonably infer that a
Congress that enacted civil rights legislation affecting the very provision in question as recently as five years ago would have corrected
such a widespread misapprehension-especially
if it intended to
54
employees.
former
exclude
The following argument presented in Berry v. Stevinson Chevro-

let,'5 refers to a case in which Congress directly responded to a statutory interpretation decision with which it disagreed. In Berry the
defendants argued that the,
Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Aramco Services Co., 499

U.S. 244 (1991), constitutes an intervening case requiring [the
court's] reconsideration of [it's prior decision in] Rutherford.
Rutherford eschewed a literal reading of the section in favor of a
reading that comported with the broad, remedial goals of Title
VII. [Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977)]. Defendants argue that Aramco
stands for the proposition that a plain or
56 literal reading of Title
VII must govern judicial interpretation.
However, the defendants' argument in Berry was baseless, in
light of what occurred after the Aramco decision came down.
Shortly after the Court interpreted the application of the statute
narrowly, Congress overruled the result and amended Title VII, to
rebut the "literal reading" and the presumption of strictly territorial
52. See Todd Mitchell, Note, Terminate, Then Retaliate: Title VII Section 704(a) and

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 75 N.C. L. REv. 376, 399 (1996).
53. See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 670.

54. Mitchell, supra note 52, at 399.
55. 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 985. The court in fact struck down this argument and stated:
Aramco concerned a distinct tenet of statutory interpretation - the presumption

against extra-territorial application of United States laws. In Aramco, the Supreme
Court held that Congress did not evince a clear intent to make Title VII applicable
beyond national boundaries and therefore a United States employee working in
Saudi Arabia could not bring a Title VII action against his United States employer.
See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 250. While Aramco and Rutherford both interpret the reach
of Title VII, their interpretations are rooted in distinct principles of statutory
construction. Aramco only interprets Title VII with respect to the presumption
against extraterritoriality, a tool of statutory interpretation which was irrelevant in
Rutherford. Consequently, Aramco does not undermine Rutherford's holding.
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application.57 This exemplifies the theory that if Congress disagreed with judicial interpretation of a statute, they would immediately reform the statute in response. Therefore, the fact that
Congress has failed to take any action in response to the circuit
courts' broad interpretation of section 704(a), can be interpreted as
Congress's silent affirmation that a broad interpretation is in fact
the correct one.58
III.

SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS: NARROW VS. BROAD JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE
ANTI-RETALIATION

A.

PROVISION

Narrow Interpretations

The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit which has stated flatly that
former employees are excluded from protection against any form of
retaliation.59 The Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have also
interpreted the provision narrowly in part, excluding former
employees from protection against any act of retaliation which is
personal in nature, or cannot be considered an adverse employment
action.60
The Fourth Circuit initially stated its position, excluding former
employees from protection against retaliation from their former
employers in Polsby v. Chase,61 and most recently they reiterated
this position in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 62 The majority and dissenting opinions of the Robinson decision will be discussed in more
detail below, but the following is a summary of the majority's decision (which is basically the same as the reasoning annunciated in
Polsby).
The underlying rationale of the court's opinion is that former
employees should be excluded in accordance with the "plain meaning" approach. According to the Fourth Circuit, the statute clearly
57. See Gary B. Born, INTERNATIONAL

CIVIL LITIGATION

IN

U.S.

COURTS:

576 (1996).
58. See Mitchell, supra note 52, at 399.
59. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843
(1997); Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S.
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS

1048 (1993).

60. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d
484 (7th Cir. 1991).
61. 970 F.2d 1360 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 1048 (1993).
62. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
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provides that it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against
"employees" and "applicants," and in the court's opinion, if Congress intended former employees to be covered, they would have
explicitly provided so.63 They concluded that former employees
have alternative remedies; for example, under section 704(a), an
applicant who is not hired by a prospective employer because they
sought Title VII relief from a former employer, can bring suit
against the prospective employer. 64 Furthermore, they held that
the rationale presented by the other circuit courts, which have
interpreted the term "employee" broadly, to include a former
employee, is unpersuasive, 65 and "disregard[s] . .. the established
'66
analytical framework for statutory construction.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's sweeping exclusion of former
employees from protection under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, two other circuit courts, the Third and Seventh Circuits, have
concluded that former employees are protected from certain types
of acts.67 These courts have made the distinction between retaliatory acts which are personal in nature or unrelated to the employment context (which are unprotected), and those which are deemed
"adverse employment actions" (which should be protected under
Section 704(a)).68
The Seventh Circuit was the first circuit court to annunciate a
narrow interpretation of the term "employee," and the Fourth Circuit stated that they were following the Seventh Circuit's lead in
their holding in Polsby.69 Initially the holding in Reed v. Shepard7°
appeared to be broader than the court actually intended, and many
interpreted it to mean that former employees did not have standing
under Title VII to bring retaliation suits against former employers.71 However, the Seventh Circuit recently clarified the rule
63. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330; Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1364.
64. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1365.
65. See id.
66. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332.
67. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Charlton v.
Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994)); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir.
1991) (later clarified by Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996)).

68. See Nelson v. Upsala College, 51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Charlton v.
Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994)); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir.
1991) (later clarified by Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996)).

69. See Polsby, 970 F.2d at 1364.
70. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
71. See, e.g., Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360.
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promulgated in Reed, in the case Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel.72 The
court stated that Reed, "excludes from the realm of actionable
retaliation only those post-termination acts which are unrelated to
the plaintiff's employment. Conduct that is related to the plaintiff's
employment or his efforts to gain new employment is not addressed
by Reed."7 3 The court went on to say that they believe that "posttermination acts of retaliation that have a nexus to employment are
actionable under Title V ." 74
The Third Circuit asserts basically the same position, however,
they did it in the reverse order of the Seventh Circuit. The Third
Circuit followed a broad interpretation of the term "employee" in
the case Charlton v. Paramus Board of Education.7' However, a
year later, it too needed to clarify its position (to resemble that of
the Seventh Circuit), in Nelson v. Upsala College.76 The majority in
Nelson stated,
That case [Charlton] does not hold that all post-employment
activity of an employer aimed at a former employee in response
to her having brought or participated in a Title VII proceeding is
actionable under section 704. Rather, Charlton simply holds that
a former employee has standing to bring a retaliation suit under
section 704.... Indeed, if anything, Charlton suggests that postemployment conduct, to give rise to a retaliatiod complaint, must
relate to an employment relationship. Charlton makes this implication by indicating that "courts ... have extended anti-retaliation protection... where the retaliation results in discharge from
a later job, a refusal 77
to hire the plaintiff, or other professional or
occupational harm."
Therefore, in light of these decisions, it is clear that an interpretation totally excluding former employees from pursuing any type of
retaliation suit against their former employers is the minority view,
currently held only by the Fourth Circuit. 78 It is a view with a very
narrow analysis, which ignores the "chilling effect" it could have on
individuals from asserting their rights under Title VII if they are not
guaranteed protection once the employment relationship has
72. 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996).

73. Id. at 888 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75.
76.
77.
78.

25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995).
Nelson, 51 F.3d at 387.
See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325; Polsby v. Chase, 970 F.2d 1360.
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ended. 79 Although Reed and Nelson are considered to be narrow
constructions, in actuality they are not; they do not refute that a
former employee is protected from retaliation related to the
employment relationship. They only assert that acts unrelated to
employment (even if deemed retaliatory in nature) should be
excluded. 0
B. Broad Interpretations
The Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have interpreted the provision broadly, prohibiting retaliation against former employees, in circumstances related to employment.8 ' Since there are a number of cases which follow a broad
interpretation of the term "employee," rather than reiterate the
reasoning in each case, the author will summarize the general arguments presented supporting this interpretation.
In response to the "plain meaning" approach urged by supporters
of a narrow interpretation, supporters of a broad interpretation
have argued that the statutory language of section 704(a) is ambiguous. 2 Supporters of a broad interpretation have asserted that a
narrow interpretation is inappropriate in light of their opinion that
Congress intended to protect former employees from retaliation. 3
Furthermore, they have argued that since Title VII enforcement
relies on individual initiative and determination, employees and
former employees who come forward must be protected from retaliation. 4 Absent protection, aggrieved individuals would be
deterred from invoking their rights.8 " As stated in Charlton,86
79. See Robinson, 70 F.3d 325; Polsby, 970 F.2d 1360.

80. See Nelson, 51 F.3d 383; Reed, 939 F.2d 484.
81. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d

Cir. 1994); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991); Sherman v. Burke
Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th

Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge
Corp., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d

1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
82. See Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title VIi's Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employees
Protected After the Employment Relationship Has Ended?, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797, 806-7
(1996); Todd Mitchell, Note, Terminate, Then Retaliate:Title VII Section 704(a) and Robinson
v. Shell Oil Co., 75 N.C. L. Rev. 376, 382-83 (1996).

83. See Tafuri, supra note 82, at 809-10.
84. See id.
85. See Mitchell, supra note 82, at 382 (discussing Judge Hall's dissent in Robinson).
86. Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Title VII prohibits retaliation "to protect the employee who
utilizes the tools provided by Congress to protect his rights." The
need for protection against retaliation does not disappear when
the employment relationship ends. Indeed, post-employment
blacklisting is sometimes more damaging than on-the-job discrimination because an employee subject to discrimination on the
job will often continue to receive a paycheck while a former
employee subject to retaliation may be prevented from obtaining
any work in the trade or occupation previously pursued.87
The Tenth Circuit was the first court to consider the issue of
whether section 704(a) applied to former employees in Rutherford
v. American Bank of Commerce.8 In Rutherford, the court
asserted that in cases involving such a remedial statute, 89 a broad
interpretation is favorable and consistent with the purpose and
objectives of the statute, and that a narrow reading excluding former employees was unjustified. 90
The court in Rutherford based its reasoning on two other cases
decided shortly beforehand, 91 involving the corresponding provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act.92 The Tenth Circuit first cited
Dunlop v. Carriage CarpetShop,9 3 stating that it was aligning itself
with the position taken by the Sixth Circuit in that case. In Dunlop,
the Sixth Circuit held that,
A former employee, voluntarily separated from his former
employer, was protected from discrimination by his former
employer under 29 U.S.C. sec. 215, even though the statute did
not refer to "former employees" and in fact only proscribed discrimination against employees.... [T]he Sixth Circuit concluded
that former employees, no less than present employees, needed
protection from discrimination by employers resentful of the fact
87. Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
88. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
89. See id. at 1165 (stating that, "[a] statute which is remedial in nature should be
liberally construed.").

90. See id.
91. See id. at 1165-66 (citing Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Shop, 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir.
1977); Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.
1972)).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1991) (providing that it is unlawful to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against "any employee" because such employee has filed a
complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
93. 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977).
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that a complaint had been made against them for alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.9 4
The Rutherford court then went on to further address this rationale by discussing the case in which the Dunlop court cites, Hodgson
v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc. 9 5 The Rutherford
court in its conclusion, quoted the Fifth Circuit's commentary in
Hodgson:
The possibility of retaliation, however, is far from being "remote
and speculative" with respect to former employees for three reasons. First, it is a fact of business life that employers almost invariably require prospective employees to provide the names of
their previous employees as references when applying for a job.
Defendant's former employees could be severely handicapped in
their efforts to obtain new jobs if the defendant should brand
them as "informers" when references are sought. Second, there
is the possibility that a former employee may be subjected to
retaliation by his new employer if that employer finds out that
the employee has in the past cooperated with the Secretary.
Third, a former employee may find it desirable or necessary to
seek reemployment with the defendant. In such a case the former employee would
stand the same risk of retaliation as the
96
present employee.
The following year, the Second Circuit followed suit, and adopted
the broad interpretation approach of the Tenth Circuit, in the case
Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge.97 In Pantchenko, the Second Circuit
expanded upon the inappropriateness of a literal reading of the
statute by noting the following wise observation of Learned Hand:
"'[I]t is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of the words of
a statute is not always a safe guide to its meaning."' 9 8
Since the late seventies, the other circuits which have broadly
interpreted section 704(a) have grounded their decisions on the
rationale first promulgated by the Tenth Circuit in Rutherford v.
American Bank of Commerce,99 which was reiterated shortly thereafter by the Second Circuit in Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Company,
94. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165-66 (citing Dunlop, 548 F.2d 139).
95. 459 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1972).

96. Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1166 (citing Hodgson, 459 F.2d 303).
97. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978).

98. Id. at 1055.
99. 565 F.2d 1162.
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Inc.' Since that time, the courts have slightly expanded upon this
theory of broad interpretation, but the underlying theme throughout is the same: In order to effectuate the purpose of the statute,
"former employees" must be provided with the same sort of protection from retaliation as current employees and applicants. 10 '
IV. ROBINSON V. SHELL OIL Co.

A.

The Court of Appeals Decision

The underlying rationale expressed by the Fourth Circuit, in support of a narrow interpretation of the statute, was primarily based
on the "plain meaning" doctrine. According to the majority, in the
absence of an explicit provision covering former employees, the
statutory language is unambiguous, and there is no need to look any
further. 0 2 The majority stated that,
there are, however, rare and narrow exceptions when courts may
stray beyond the plain language of unambiguous statutes. One
such circumstance arises if the literal application of statutory language would lead to an absurd result.... Another circumstance
permitting courts to look beyond the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language arises if literal application of the statutory
language would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intent of Congress; in such cases,0 the
intent of Congress rather
3
than the strict language controls.'
The majority then concluded that,
neither exception applies because both require Congress to have
made plain that it intended a result different than literal application would produce. Indeed, the absence of any language in Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision referring to former employees is
strong evidence that0 4Congress did not intend Title VII to protect
former employees.'

100. 581 F.2d 1052.

101. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, 87 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 1996); Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996); Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194 (3d
Cir. 1994); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1991); Sherman v. Burke
Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th
Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge
Corp., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d
1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
102. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1995).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 330.
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In the majority's opinion, the circuit courts which have supported
a broad interpretation, disregard the established analytical framework for statutory construction and inappropriately rely only on
broad policy considerations. °5 The majority stated that these other
circuit courts,
fail to heed to the Supreme Court's repeated mandate: "We have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,
this
10 6
first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete."'
The majority asserted that the type of practices which Title VII
forbids strongly point to the exclusion of former employees, since
according to the majority, these practices do not extend beyond the
employment relationship and are no longer relevant once that relationship has been terminated. 0 7 The anti-retaliation provision does
not redress post-employment retaliation because of the second element of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII; in order
for an employee to suffer an "adverse employment action," according to the majority, such conduct must occur during the employment relationship. 08
In response to the majority's decision, Circuit Judge Hall made a
very convincing point by posing a hypothetical which resulted in
"grossly absurd [and] plainly unintended result[s]."' 10 9 In his hypothetical, Judge Hall posed a situation in which two employees are to
leave their place of employment, after filing Title VII claims against
their employer on the same day.1 0 Both requested references
shortly before they terminate their employment with the
employer."' Hall then stated that an accidental mail delay, of one
of the two (allegedly retaliatory) bad references, could have created
a situation in which one employee may have redress against the
employer and the other employee "would be left in the cold.""' 2
105. See id. at 332.

106. Id.
107. See id. at 330.
108. See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331.

109. Id. at 333 (Hall, J., dissenting).
110. See id.
ll. See id.
112. See id. The following is Judge Hall's hypothetical:

Imagine that on Friday, the first day of the month, XYZ Corporation decides to
terminate two of its line workers, Smith and Jones, and immediately gives them two
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Hall stated that the majority could obviously not dispute the fact
that both employees were equally "harmed" by their employer. 13
Yet, due to a mere mail delay (of one day), according to the majority's opinion, only one of the two employees (the one who was1 1 a4
current employee when the letter was sent) would have standing.
posed what could be referred to as an
Clearly, Hall's hypothetical
"absurd result," 115 as mentioned by the majority, and pulls the rug
out from the basis of the majority's opinion.
Judge Murnaghan, in support of Judge Hall's view, also made a
persuasive argument for the broad interpretation of the term
"employee," especially with his concluding remark: "After all,
despite the long lapse of time, Joe DiMaggio can still be referred to
as a center fielder for the New York Yankees. 1" 6 Murnaghan's
statement illustrated how a former employee could still reasonably
be referred to as an employee of his/her former place of employment, and in fact often is.
The dissent blatantly combated the majority's underlying arguments and made it clear that the majority's approach was too
focused and did not properly consider the possible repercussions of
completely excluding former employees." 7 "By [the majority]
choosing instead to focus exclusively on the time when the
employee was actively working, the majority has framed its inquiry
much too narrowly; such a myopic approach only frustrates Conweeks' written notice. Smith and Jones, each believing that she has been unlawfully
discriminated against, file charges with the EEOC on Monday the fourth. Unable,
however, to afford the luxury of undue optimism, both Smith and Jones explore the
possibility of signing on with XYZ's competitor, LMNOP, Inc. On Tuesday the
twelfth, XYZ's personnel department receives

a letter from its LMNOP

counterpart, requesting employment information and references on Smith and
Jones. Annoyed that the pair have filed EEOC charges against the company,
XYZ's personnel director intentionally and vindictively prepares false reports for

dissemination to LMNOP. The spurious reports are place in separate envelopes
and stamped for mailing on Friday the fifteenth, which also happens to be Smith

and Jones' last day at XYZ. Although Smith's report is included in Friday's
outgoing mail, Jones' report is inadvertently excluded, and, therefore, not sent to
LMNOP until Monday the eighteenth.
Id. at 332.

113.
114.
115.
116,
117.

See Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332-33.
See id. at 333.
Id. at 329 (referring to the language used in the majority's opinion).
Id. at 335 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting).
See id. at 332-35.
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gress's attempt, through Title VII, to eradicate workplace
discrimination."'1 8
B. The Oral Argument: Speculation on the
Supreme Court's Decision
In light of the narrow basis of the Fourth Circuit's opinion,"1 9 and
the thought provoking points made by the dissenting opinions, it
did not appear that the Supreme Court would rely heavily on the
decision of the lower court. Rather, after hearing the questions
posed during the oral argument for the case on November 6,
1996,1"

it appeared that the Supreme Court would give the issue

much broader consideration than the Fourth Circuit, and hopefully
delve into some of the arguments made by both sides in their appellate briefs.
Although Robinson built a strong appellate case, and with the
help of the EEOC, presented a powerful argument,' 2 ' prior to the
decision coming down, it was not completely clear that the Court
would support a broad interpretation of the statute, in light of the
views expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
[They] appeared unpersuaded, saying employees could gain
the upper hand over their employers by filing a discrimination
complaint a few days before they quit or [in anticipation of]
being fired. Employers faced with the possibility of a postemployment retaliation claim would be loath to say anything bad
about their former employee to a prospective employer. 22
Justice Scalia stated that if former employees were covered, the
only way an employer could definitely avoid liability, and avoid
being sued, would be to not give out any references. 23 Furthermore, Scalia
118. Id. at 334 (Hall, J., dissenting).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66, 78-80, & 102-108.
120. The author went to the Supreme Court on Nov. 6, 1996, to hear the oral arguments
presented. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 1996 WL 656475.
121. See Petitioner's Brief & EEOC's Amicus Brief, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct.

843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
122. Steve Lash, Jovial Justices Consider Two Title VII Cases,WEST's LEGAL NEWS 11908,

Nov. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 638751.
123. See id. Scalia stated, "'You would be very wise to file an EEOC complaint before
you quit.... He [the former employer] is buying a lawsuit,' if he says anything unflattering

about the ex-employee." Id.
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[d]isagreed with the notion that the intent of lawmakers was evident thirty two years ago' 24 when Title VII was passed. [He
said,] "If I was Congress, I would have a hard time figuring out
how an employer could discriminate against an employee after
the employment relationship is terminated."' 125
However, on the flip side, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
appeared unconvinced with Shell's attorney, Lawrence C. Butler's
assertion that, "[t]he Act does afford more protection to those who
'
are employed than those who are not employed."126
Justice Ginsburg stated that Butler's argument would "allow employers to retaliate freely against people they had fired for filing discrimination
claims. It tells employers, 'You are home free."" 27
Ironically, on a more surprising note, was the comment made by
the conservative Justice Clarence Thomas (who proceeded to write
the Court's unanimous decision),' 28 who rarely questions lawyers
during oral arguments. Justice Thomas asked Butler, "whether it
was [his] position that an employer could turn to a former
employee and say, 'Look, you ified a claim against
me, and I will
29
see that you never work in this business again.'"
At one point, Justice Souter also, "appeared ready to have...
Butler concede that former employees must enjoy Title VII protection, otherwise fired workers would be unable to sue former
employers for discriminatory terminations."' 30 Then later on, Justices Kennedy and Stevens got into a debate with Robinson's lawyer, Allen M. Lenchek, over whether a company pension kept the
employment relationship alive; Justice Kennedy felt it did, and for
the purposes
of Title VII, it could not be taken away in
3
retaliation.' '
124. As implied by Allen M. Lenchek, counsel for Robinson, during oral arguments. See
Barbara Yuill, Discrimination:Supreme Court Hears OralArgument on Title VII Coverage of
Ex-Employees, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 216, Nov. 7, 1996, at A-1.
125. Id.
126. Transcript of Oral Argument, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 1996 WL 656475 at *41.
127. Id. at *41-42.
128. Although Justice Thomas is a conservative, the fact that he served as the Chairman
of the EEOC during President Ronald Regan's administration may account for his
sentiments on this issue. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Ban on Bias ForbidsRetaliation,
Even Against Ex-Employees, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1997, at A12.
129. Lash, supra note 122.
130. Lash, supra note 122.
131. See Lash, supra note 122.
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After the oral argument (in light of the comments made, questions posed, and the general views of the individual Justices), prior
to the decision being released, the author presumed that Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, Kennedy, and probably Thomas, would support a
broad interpretation, and that at least Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia would support a narrow interpretation and want to
affirm the Fourth Circuit's opinion based on the "plain meaning"
approach. At that point, it was difficult to speculate on which way
Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer would vote, so it was hard
to say for sure what the outcome would be. Yet, it seemed likely
that at least one of the "indeterminable" votes would swing, in
order to enable the Court to find in accordance with the majority of
the circuits and interpret the term "employee" broadly to cover former employees. Therefore, the reversal of the Fourth Circuit's
decision, in light of the analysis done shortly after the oral arguments, was not surprising; however, the fact that the decision was
unanimous was quite a shock.
V.

THE UNANIMOUS SUPREME COURT DECISION

The Supreme Court handed down its unanimous decision in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,132 on Tuesday, February 18,1997, holding
that former employees have the same rights as current employees
and job applicants to sue on the basis that they were retaliated
against for asserting their protected rights under Title VII. 13 3 The
decision was written by Justice Clarence Thomas, who served as the
chairman of the EEOC during the Reagan administration.'
In the decision, the Court first determined whether "the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the
particular dispute in the case."'135 According to the Court, this
determination must be made in light of three factors: "the language
itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole."' 36 After analyzing these
factors, the Court concluded, in direct contradiction to the finding
of the Fourth Circuit, that the term "employees" as used in section
704(a), "is ambiguous as to whether it excludes former employ132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

117 S.Ct. 843 (1997).
See id. at 849.
See Greenhouse, supra note 128, at A12.
Robinson, 117 S.Ct. at 846.
Id.
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ees."'137 The Court stated a variety of reasons why the statutory
language is in fact ambiguous. Justice Thomas first wrote that the
lack of temporal qualifiers in either section 704(a) (the anti-retaliation provision) or section 701(f) (the definition of the term
"employees"), fails to make it plain that section 704(a) "protects
only persons still employed at the time of the retaliation," and
therefore results in ambiguity. 138 Thomas then cited the argument
made by Robinson, 139 noting that "a number of provisions in Title
VII use the term 'employees' to mean something more inclusive or
different than 'current employees.'"14° Finally, Thomas noted that
the failure to include "former employees" (since the statute specifically designates "employees" and "applicants for employment") or
to use the broader term "individual" (which is used in other portions of the statute) is not evidence of congressional intent not to
include former employees.' 4 '
After concluding that section 704(a) is ambiguous, the Court was
"left to resolve that ambiguity."' 4 In resolving this ambiguity, the
Court looked to the broader context of the statute for assistance.
In doing so, the Court concluded that "several sections of the statute plainly contemplate that former employees will make use of the
remedial mechanisms of Title VII."'1 43 Furthermore, the Court
agreed with the petitioner's argument, and the EEOC's position,
that the word "employees" includes former employees because
to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection
afforded by Section 704(a).... According to [the] EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the protection of Section 704(a)
would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the
threat of post-employment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to [the] EEOC, and would provide a
perverse incentive for employers to fire employees who might
bring Title VII claims.'

137. Id.
138. Id.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Petitioner's Brief at 8-13, Robinson, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847 (citing examples such as sections 706(g)(1) and 717(b)).
See id. at 848.
Id.
Id.

144. Id.
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The Court deemed these persuasive arguments, consistent with
the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision: "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."' 45
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's narrow
interpretation and dismissed its "plain meaning" approach, after
concluding that the statutory language was in fact ambiguous, and
that in light of the broad purpose of Title VII, former employees
should rightly be covered under section 704(a). 4 6
A.

The Missing Piece: Scalia's Dissent

Although the fact that the Court ruled in favor of a broad interpretation is not surprising, the fact that it was a unanimous decision
is. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia seemed hesitant
to adopt such an approach during the oral arguments. Furthermore, such a decision seems completely out of sync with Justice
Scalia's general plain meaning approach, or his "new textualist"
approach.
In other words, it appears clear that in order to effectuate the
purpose of Title VII, former employees should be protected under
the anti-retaliation provision. However, it seemed as though the
Fourth Circuit's opinion, deeming the statutory language unambiguous, would have appealed to Justice Scalia and provided him with
a foundation upon which to apply his "plain meaning" approach. In
general, Justice Scalia's theory 4 7 is that,
the Court's role is not to implement the preferences of either the
enacting or the current legislature, but to apply the "plain meaning" of the statutory text as passed by both chambers of Congress
and presented to the President. The new textualism posits that
truly "neutral" statutory interpretation does not consider the
"subjective" preferences of Congress, only the "objective" meaning of a statute's words. If the plain meaning of the words runs
counter to current legislative preferences, textualism's adherents
reason, Congress can always amend the statute. New textualists
145. Id.
146. See Robinson, 117 S.Ct. at 848-49.
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress!
President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 676 (1991) (referring to Justice Scalia's
theory as "new textualism").
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believe it is better ....for Congress to do the148
amending than for

the Court to do so through "interpretation."

However, some things are not in fact as predictable as they first
seem, and Justice Scalia apparently found the arguments presented
by the petitioner and the EEOC to be more persuasive and logically appealing than the Fourth Circuit's opinion and the arguments
presented by the respondent. 49
Another possible rationale behind the Supreme Court's decision
is provided by Professor William Eskridge. According to Professor
Eskridge, "civil rights statutory policy is dynamic and interactive.
Civil rights policy is interactive because it involves the cooperation,
and often the conflict, among the Congress, the President, and the
Court."' 0 Eskridge poses the following model:
The Court makes the first move when it interprets a civil rights
statute. Once the Court has interpreted the statute, the gatekeepers then decide whether they want to seek a legislative override; if they do, Congress must decide what policy to adopt, and it
is not constrained by the gatekeepers' choice. If Congress passes
a statute, the President must decide whether to veto it. Should
the President veto it, Congress must decide whether to override
the President's veto. 51
In his model, Eskridge suggests that the Court is in a sense a "political actor.' 1 52 Basically, Eskridge states that,
each player in making its moves will not want to make a decision
that will be overturned by another player with the authority to do
so. In other words, in deciding whether to act, each player will
do nothing if153
it realizes that its decision will be overturned by the
next player.
In the author's opinion, this model seems to provide a logical reason for the unanimous decision. Basically, had the Supreme
Court's decision been split, rather than unanimous, the saga would
not have been over. Supporters of protection for former employees, as the author, would have supported efforts for legislative
reform, in order to counteract the statutory ambiguity and backlash
148. l at 676-77.
149. See Robinson, 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 641-42.
151. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 643-44.

152. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 664.
153. Eskridge, supra note 147, at 644.
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from employer groups, in order to truly protect the rights of former
employees. Yet, now such a recommendation seems pointless. The
rights of former employees are no longer in jeopardy. Backlash
from employer groups is not going to be very abundant or successful, in light of a unanimous Supreme Court decision, without the
support of the conservative Justices on their side.
B. Deference to the EEOC
Although not an explicit Chevron'54 decision, it does appear that
the Court did in fact give deference to the EEOC on this issue, and
this may possibly be the beginning of a new attitude towards giving
greater consideration to the position of the EEOC. This subtle deference to the EEOC was also quite surprising in view of the Court's
prior attitude in other cases calling for such deference.' 5 5 As one
author has commented:
In this post-Chevron era, in which the judiciary often defers to
agency interpretations of statutes, one would suppose it is the
EEOC to whom Congress, expressly or impliedly, confided the
authority to interpret the laws administered by that agency. Yet
the Supreme Court has not confirmed this supposition. Instead,
despite strong disagreement from within the Court, the majority
has suggested a lesser role for the EEOC on questions of statutory interpretation than is enjoyed by most independent agencies, in turn reserving for the judiciary a156greater lawmaking role
in the employment discrimination area.
In the author's opinion, it is only proper for the Court to recognize the EEOC's expertise in this area and to seriously consider the
positions promulgated by the agency in its Compliance Manual.'57
"The decision marks the second time [in 1997] all nine justices have
issued a ruling in which they sided with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in a Title VII case."' 5 s Therefore, Robin154. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (holding that Congressional delegation of law-interpreting power to an agency
need not be express, but could be implied from the statutory scheme); Rebecca Hanner

White, The EEOC, The Courts and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the
Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation,1995 UTAH L. REv. 51, 54 (1991).
155. See White, supra note 154, at 54.

156. White, supra note 154, at 54.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
158. Barbara Yuil, Companies Can Be Sued Under Title VII By Former Employees,
Supreme Court Rules, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 33, Feb. 19, 1997, at AA-1.
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son may be a bright light indicating a change in the majority view,
and may signify the beginning of a new trend towards deference to
the EEOC.
Rebecca Hanner White makes a compelling argument that the
courts "should find an implied delegation to the EEOC of authority
to interpret Title VII."'1 59 If this is to occur, clearly the costs associated 6 ° with Title VII (related to many of its ambiguous provisions)
will be reduced, and the controversy over judicial interpretation will
be virtually eliminated. Furthermore, "[i]t [will place] important
policy choices into the hands of a politically accountable actor,
rather than those of politically unaccountable courts."16 ' Not to
mention the fact that, "the enforcement powers granted the agency
under Title VII make it obvious that statutory interpretation by the
agency necessarily must occur."' 62 Finally, it only makes sense that
the EEOC is given deference in its interpretation of Title VII, since
it is, "the sole arm of the federal government with an exclusive
focus on eradicating job discrimination."' 63
The Aramco decision, discussed supra,' helps illustrate the benefits of deference to the EEOC. This case was a clear situation in
which, "the Court refused to defer to the EEOC's construction of
Title VII that allowed extraterritorial application of the statute.
Although admitting the statute was ambiguous, the Court did not
follow the Chevron approach.... ."65 Consequently, the Court held
that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially, and Congress
amended the statute shortly thereafter in order to counteract the
decision.'66 However, had the Court deferred to the agency's interpretation initially, the ensuing legislative effort and time could have
been conserved.
159. White, supra note 154, at 57-58.
160. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative
Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEms. 123, 126-30
(1992) (discussing the costs associated with ambiguous statutes, i.e., increased legal research
costs, litigation costs, judicial system costs, increased unlawful activity, decreased lawful
activity, discrimination, separation of powers problems, replacement costs, and diminished
utility and justice).
161. White, supra note 154, at 107.
162. White, supra note 154, at 96.
163. White, supra note 154, at 53.
164. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.

165. White, supra note 154, at 74.
166. See Gary B. Born,
COMMENTARY AND MATERiALS
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576 (3d ed. 1996); White, supra note 154, at 74.
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Furthermore, Robinson also illustrates the benefits of deference
to the EEOC in interpreting Title VII-had all of the circuit courts
done so initially, a broad interpretation would have been adopted
and this issue would have never come to the Supreme Court. 167
However, once the issue reached the Supreme Court, the EEOC's
position was given the consideration it deserves, and although the
Court did not explicitly state that it was giving deference to the
agency, it does appear that is in fact what they did.168 Hopefully,
Robinson marks the beginning of a future trend which will substantially mitigate the time and effort devoted for future debates over
other ambiguous portions of Title VII.
VI.

THE

ANTICIPATED RESPONSE FROM EMPLOYERS

Reporters deemed Tuesday, February 18, 1997, "a bad day for
business," in the Supreme Court.1 69 After the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Robinson, business advocates said that,
"the ruling strengthens the law against workplace bias and will
make bosses more reluctant to offer candid job references for fear
of being sued."' 70 At a minimum, the decision will certainly fuel
managers' complaints that giving honest job references is not
always easy these days.' 7 '
According to Allan Weitzman, "Relevant information about pro72
spective employees is drying up, and this is another reason why.'
A number of business groups say that in reality the decision will
make employers rethink a decision to give a negative job reference
- even if warranted - to a former worker who previously filed a
discrimination complaint. 173 General Counsel to the Equal
Employment Advisory Counsel, Ann Reesman, said that the deci167. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.

168. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848-49 (1997).
169. See Edward Felsenthal, High Court's Business Jabs Include Ruling on Workers' Bias
Claims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1997, at B12.
170. William D. Frumkin & Louis G. Santangelo, Title Vii's Anti-Retaliation Provision
Extends to Former Employees, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 19, 1997, at 1; Tony Mauro, Ex-workers' Suits
Claiming Retaliation OK, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 1997, at 1A.
171. See Felsenthal, supra note 169, at B12.
172. Mauro, supra note 170, at 1A; see Allan H. Weitzman & Kathleen M. McKenna, In
Light of Several DecisionsHolding Employers Liable for Their Employee References, Many

Companies Choose Not to Give Any, NAT'L L. J., May 19, 1997, at B4 (Mr. Weitzman & Ms.
McKenna are employment lawyers from Florida).

173. See Joan Biskupic, Court Protects Ex-Employees From Retaliation, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 1997, at A6.
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sion will likely limit employers' references to merely "name, rank
and serial number."' 74 This position was supported by the statement made by Mona Zeilberg, Senior Counsel for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce National Litigation Center, who stated, "It will
probably fuel litigation in this area ....[a]nd it could possibly lead
to even more anxiety about writing letters of reference for employees. The policy of many companies now is only to confirm dates of
employment."' 75 Some employer representatives even say that
they expect "employers to refuse to provide references or to
require that employees surrender their right to sue in exchange for
references."' 76 The new mantra of employment attorneys for their
corporate clients, "especially those whose former employees have
filed civil rights complaints [is]: Speak no evil, and if you speak, be
very careful."' 7 7

However, contrary to what these employer groups are saying, the
decision does not impose onerous, undue burdens on employers to
avoid liability. Rather, as Richard T. Seymour of the Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law said, "[the] decision,
combined with other recent rulings, sends a message to employers:
'Stop thinking that there is refuge in technical loopholes. It is time
to start living up to the obligations of the law."" 7 Basically, all the
Robinson decision does is enable former employees (who previously filed discrimination suits) to bring suit against employers who
they feel gave them retaliatory negative references, which were
unfounded. The decision in no way implies that former employees
can successfully bring suit against any former employer who gave
them a negative job reference, which was in fact grounded in a poor
employee record (i.e. unsatisfactory performance, bad attitude,
etc.). In fact, a number of states "have enacted legislation to protect employers from the threat of having to defend a defamation
action brought by an employee who disagrees with the reference

174. Id.
175. Frank J.Murray, Ex-Employees Protected by Bias Laws, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1997, at Al.
176. Aaron Epstein, Court Expands Law's Scope Over Vengeful Job References, YORK
DAILY REc., Feb. 19, 1997, at 3.
177. Dominic Bencivenga, Silence is Golden: Employees Link Negative Reference to
Retaliation,N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1997, at 5.
178. Biskupic, supra note 173, at A6.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss2/6

28

1998]

Fenn: Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.: Providing Former Employees with Protec
Providing Former Employees with Protectionfrom Retaliation

provided," and the rest of the nation appears to be following suit.179
Therefore, "the argument that allowing former employees to bring
a retaliatory action claim under Title VII destroys the vital
exchange of information about employees is practically rendered
moot."18 0

In the author's view, Robinson in no way imposes any undue burdens on employers, in order to avoid liability. The only repercussion that the Robinson decision will have on employers is to force
them to keep complete and accurate personnel records. In other
words, an employer should feel free to give a negative job reference
for a former employee, if he/she is so deserving of one. All the
employer will have to do is make sure that they have verifying documentation for the references they give, and that they are adhering
to their general policy of giving references (as they have done in the
past), in order to combat any possible allegations of retaliation.' 8 '
In other words, employers should have strict policies requiring
supervisors to complete employee reviews and disciplinary memos,
in order to ensure thorough and accurate personnel records. Furthermore, employers need to promulgate policies of non-discrimination and non-retaliation, and make their reference policies clear
to all employees at the outset of their employment. If employers
implement such personnel policies, or improve existing ones, they
should have no trouble providing substantial evidence of an
employee's work performance and employment history, and compliance with their annunciated company policies, to support the references they give. Obviously, an employer will not be held liable
for retaliation if in fact they can substantiate why they provided a
negative review for a former employee, and demonstrate that the
reference was in compliance with company policy.

179. Tracey H. Cohen, Supreme Court Cases, 56 MND.
L. REv. 1178, 1191-92 & n.126
(1997).
180. Id. at 1192.
181. See Sarah B. Boucher, Job References: Title VII Joins Defamation as Employer

Concern in South Carolina,8 S.C. LAW. 32,34-35 (May/June 1997); see also Douglas E. Ray,
Title VII Retaliation Cases: CreatingA New ProtectedClass, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 405, 432-34
(1997) (discussing tips to employers for avoiding retaliation and the appearance of
retaliation).
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CONCLUSION

In concluding, based on the foregoing analysis of this debate, it is

clear that the Supreme Court properly granted former employees
the protection they deserve. Former employees should be protected1 82 under section 704(a), from retaliatory acts related to the
employment realm,8 3 after the employment relationship has ended.
In light of the purpose of Title VII, 184 and the nature of its enforcement,'18 5 it is only logical that they be provided with the same protection given to current employees and applicants; if they were
denied this protection, the results could be absurd. 186 Although a
bit surprising,'8 7 the unanimous Supreme Court decision provides

former employees with solid protection from retaliation by their
former employers, and hopefully indicates a trend of deference to
the EEOC for future debates over other ambiguous portions of
Title VII. Furthermore, despite statements made by employer
advocates, concerning the inhibiting consequences of the decision
and the resulting fear of employers to provide honest negative references, Robinson does not impose any undue burdens on employers and simply requires them to live up to their legal obligations. 188
Donna P. Fenn

182. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
184. See supra text accompanying note 45.
185. See supra text accompanying note 46.

186. See supra text accompanying notes 109-15 (discussing Judge Hall's dissent in
Robinson).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 132-68.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 164-81.
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